Introduction
Dams have made an important and signi…cant contribution to human development, and the bene…ts derived from them have been considerable. Dams were built to provide water for irrigated agriculture, industrial and domestic (households) use, to generate hydropower or to help control ‡oods. But dams also altered and diverted river ‡ows, resulting in signi…cant impacts on livelihoods, …shery and the environment (Dugan et al., 2010; Beck et al., 2012) .
The latter impacts are the so-called social costs. Often dams are built for multiple of these purposes. For example, electricity generation is an important reason for building large dams in many countries, either as the primary purpose, or as an additional function such as regulating water use in di¤erent seasons. Decision-making on dam capacity choice should, therefore, trade o¤ di¤erent water uses and take into account the possible adverse impacts.
As dams have been an important means of meeting needs for water and energy services, optimal dam capacity for hydropower generation and its e¢ cient operation are important.
Recently, Haddad (2011) studies capacity choice and hydropower generation in a deterministic model with two seasons from the perspective of the dam operator. All social costs, including those for environmental externalities, are said to be incorporated in the building costs of dams and are assumed to be linear. However, for the study of environmental issues concerning dams and their operation this assumption is somewhat oversimpli…ed. Our main research questions are thus: what is the optimal dam capacity considering multiple purposes and including the possible social costs caused by externalities? The aim of this paper is to study some externalities of dams based the model of Haddad (2011) by explicitly modelling the rivalry use of water and the social costs (e.g. ‡ood damages).
We consider the following major economic functions of dam capacity building: it provides infrastructure for industrial and households'water use, hydropower generation, ‡ood damage mitigation and agricultural irrigation. Therefore, we consider multiple functions of dams.
Water use among di¤erent users is rival, i.e. there is competition among industry and households, and a hydropower generator. However, water use for irrigation and hydropower generation is non-rival or conjunctive, because irrigation water is withdrawn after hydropower is generated. Furthermore, we also consider the seasonal variations in water availability or in ‡ows. We represent all these aspects in a welfare optimization model (see e.g. Zhu and van Ierland, 2012) . Houba et al. (2013) perform a numerical analysis of such as a model that is calibrated for the Mekong River. However, the Mekong River is just one speci…c case of a wide diversity of realistic cases, which cannot inform policy makers in di¤erent river basins about the economic issues in their speci…c basin management. Solving the model analytically gives some interesting results on the choices of dam capacities under di¤erent speci…c cases of reality, such as dams solely used for ‡ooding control, for irrigation, or for hydropower generation. Our contribution of this paper is to characterize the relations between optimal dam capacity and water management under rivalry uses and externalities. We view this paper complementary to Houba et al. (2013) .
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic model that extends the model of Haddad (2011) in which dam capacity is endogenous. Section 3 presents the general case of Pareto e¢ cient dam capacity and its operation. It also discusses the welfare costs of neglecting rivalry use and externalities. Section 4 discusses the implications of the model results based on three special cases of single purpose dams: a dam is used solely for ‡ood control, for irrigation and for hydropower generation respectively. Concluding remarks follow in the last section.
The Model
Following Haddad (2011) , our model respects the hydrological basin reality. Total water available is determined by seasonal precipitation or water in ‡ows. We distinguish two seasons, the wet season (w) and the dry season (d). There is an option to build a dam with a certain capacity, denoted by D. The dam is used as infrastructure (a reservoir) to provide end users such as industry and households with water, and it is also used for hydropower generation and to store water from the wet season, denoted by y, for usage in the dry season.
Due to evaporation losses and leakage from the dam, only y, 2 (0; 1), can be used in the dry season.
1 Water availability, including in ‡ows and river ‡ows, determine water usage in each season = w; d. Water users are aggregated into three categories of representative consumers: Industry and households, irrigated agriculture and a hydropower generator.
The water balances
1 Haddad (2011) assumes = 1.
Our model extends Haddad (2011) by including other water uses (e.g. industry and households, irrigation) and ‡ood damage. The river basin is presented in Figure 1 . 
In Figure 1 , both o w and o d are expressed as the residuals from in ‡ow minus water use. The total use of water must not exceed the available dam capacity D. Dam capacity D imposes the restrictions
This completes the description of the water balances.
Bene…ts and costs
There are three water users that create economic value. Consumptive use by industry and households permanently remove amounts of water in both wet and dry seasons. The economic value is v (x ), a concave function with satiation point x > 0. Both, x w and 
Agriculture Figure 1 : Seasons, storage and water uses. 
From this objective function, it is clear that our model includes ‡ood damage, the bene…ts from consumptive use and irrigation, and allows nonlinear building costs. This completes the description of costs and bene…ts of dam capacity building and water management (allocation among di¤erent users).
Pareto e¢ cient management
In this section, we investigate Pareto e¢ cient management of dams. Because the derivations are quite technical we defer these to the appendix. In what follows we discuss the main results.
3 Haddad (2011) assumes constant costs of building dam capacity.
Pareto e¢ cient management internalizes all externalities by maximizing the welfare function (8). After substituting out the ‡ow variables o w and o d from (2) and (4), we obtain the following welfare optimization program:
where all symbols between brackets denote shadow prices.
The most realistic scenario is that D < f w , which is the case in most south-east Asia countries. Therefore, the fourth constraint holds with equality, and we substitute y = D x w q w in the …rst and fourth constraints. This eliminates these two constraints and we will solve the reduced optimization problem. Due to the assumptions we have made on the bene…ts and costs of water use and dam capacity building, the resulting welfare optimum is unique. In our analysis, we only characterize the case in which all variables x w , x d , q w , q d , i d and D are positive in the optimum. We do so, because it is the most interesting and relevant case and this limits the number of possible boundary cases to discuss.
Our …rst result is discussed in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.1 In the unique welfare optimum of (9), it holds that
Moreover, h Similarly, condition (11) illustrates the rivalry use of water in the dry season between consumptive use and irrigation. Because water for irrigation …rst passes the dam before it can be used, this part of the water can be utilized twice, namely hydropower generation before irrigation takes place. In other words, hydropower generation augments the bene…ts from irrigation. Then, condition (11) states that the marginal bene…t of water used by the industry and household sector should be equal to the marginal bene…t of hydropower generation augmented by the incremental bene…ts of reusing the water for hydropower generation for 
For the two crucial shadow prices p d and d , we derive the following result.
Proposition 3.2 In the unique welfare optimum of (9), it holds that
Although there are many economic activities and externalities related to water, the shadow prices p d and d can be fully characterized by the marginal bene…ts from hydropower generation and the marginal costs of dam capacity. These shadow prices hint at that externalities do not play a role, but one should realize that hydropower generation causes externalities (e.g. ‡ood damage downstream), and such activity can be regarded as the gateway through which external economic values enter the dam facility. This becomes apparent if Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 are combined, we can rewrite the shadow prices as
Hence, externalities of dams such as ‡ood damage or less water for irrigation do enter these prices.
Note that the existence of an optimal welfare solution implies that the shadow prices in 
From these inequalities, it is immediately clear that the marginal costs of ‡ood damage should be lower than the marginal costs of expanding dam capacity.
The solution to (9) depends upon whether the water availability (3) or dam capacity (7) or both restrict water use and hydropower generation in the dry season. Water availability in the dry season is the binding constraint, whenever (1 ) D + (x w + q w ) > f d , which we call water scarcity.
Note that the nonlinearity of the functions excludes a closed-form solution. In what follows, we report for each case the nonlinear system that characterizes the optimal solution.
Case 1: Water availability is the constraining factor in the dry season
Recall that in this case we have (3) is binding and (7) 
Obviously, the third line obeys the condition h 
Note that h 
Such solution is fully driven by reasons for ‡ood control: all pass-through from the dam in the wet season is equal to zero and all out ‡ow from the dam o w is used for hydropower generation. All other water is either consumed in the wet season or diverted to the dry season.
In general, after several substitutions, we obtain
The left-hand side expresses that building dam capacity for additional water storage reduces ‡ood damage and fraction of this water becomes available for the double utilization of hydropower generation and irrigation. Note that can be seen as a sort of discount factor that delivers the net present value of future utilization in the dry season. All these marginal bene…ts should be equal to the marginal cost of expanding dam capacity.
The optimal water management can be decentralized by having seasonal water prices, and Case 2: Dam capacity is the constraining factor in the dry season
Recall that we now have that (7) is binding while (3) is nonbinding. The optimalx w ,x d , q w ,q d ,{ d andD are the unique solution to the following non-linear system:
Since h Again, the case < 1 is qualitatively similar to the case = 1. There are three striking di¤erences between (12) and (14). The obvious one is the presence of a di¤erent binding constraint that de…nes each case. A more interesting di¤erence is c
The latter implies that an economic pressure for expanding dam capacity is driven by hydropower generation in both seasons, whereas the former only hydropower in the wet season provides such a pressure. Of course, the term h (12) and (14) is
The unique solution to system (14) characterizes the optimal values for this case. 
, the marginal costs of dam capacity is equal to the sum of the marginal bene…ts from hydropower generation in both seasons. The optimal dam capacity should be able to generate the optimal amounts of hydropower in both seasons.
As in Case 1, we obtain (13) from (14) with a similar interpretation.
The optimal water management can be decentralized by using seasonal water prices. As In this case, both (3) and (7) 
From the fourth line, we deduce that the case < 1 is qualitatively di¤erent from the case = 1, because under = 1 this line only ties two variables (x w ; q w ) to f d leaving D unrestricted and otherwise three variables are tied up. As such, we obtain insights for < 1 that are qualitatively di¤erent from Haddad (2011) . Note that in case of 'or', d = 0 pins down the solution further than the 'either'case. In fact, the case of 'or'coincides with the boundary of Case 1 where the condition de…ning Case 3 holds. It can be shown that the boundary of Case 2 is also captured by Case 3. Therefore, this case is the intermediary case between Case 1 and Case 2. Thus, system (14) completes the characterization of the unique solution for this case. 
This reduces to (13) for the 'or'case. In case h 0 w (q w ) < c 0 (D), the 'either'case implies d > 0
. Therefore, there are stronger incentives to build dam capacity. Finally, the optimal water management can be decentralized through seasonal prices as in Case 1 and 2, which we do not elaborate on to avoid repetition.
Single-purpose dams
This section discusses several special cases in which the dam ful…lls a single purpose. We obtain clearer insights for single purpose dams and study boundary cases that are excluded in the previous section.
Flood control
Floods are among the world's most frequent and damaging disasters. Dams have historically been extensively used as a defence against ‡oods. When dams are used for ‡ood control This result shows that ‡ooding will be mitigated by building dam capacity but never fully controlled. By applying implicit di¤erentiation, it follows that D is increasing in f w .
To see this, such di¤erentiation with respect to f w implies
and hence, (2010), implies D 0 = 1, because c 00 = 0. Then, increased in ‡ow due to climate change (e.g. heavy rains) will be met by an equivalent increase in dam capacity. Under increasing marginal costs, we obtain D 0 < 1 and increased in ‡ow will only be partially met by increased dam capacity.
In principle, the relation between in ‡ow and welfare optimal dam capacity is nonlinear and increasing.
Irrigation in the dry season
Irrigation is the single largest consumptive use of fresh water in the world. Half of the world's largest dams were built exclusively or primarily for irrigation. As estimated 30-40 % of the 268 million hectares of irrigated lands worldwide rely on dams (World Commission on Dams and Development, 2000) . Based on our model we may obtain more detailed insights for the single purpose irrigation dam.
In the case of dam for irrigation purposes only, we have: 
s:t:
Observe that it is suboptimal to build dam capacity up to the level that meets the
Then, we have the following result.
and
Note that for the case of constant marginal costs of dam building we would have
The …rst case applies to arid regions. Then, harvesting all water in the wet season for use in the dry season is optimal if the marginal costs of dam capacity are lower than the marginal bene…ts from agriculture. Such practice is observed in e.g. the Jordan River where water resources for Israel and Jordan are harvested in Lake Tiberias and there is almost no river ‡ow to the Dead Sea. The second case applies to semi-arid regions, where the wet season provides abundant precipitation and it is optimal to harvest only a fraction of it for use in the dry season. Then, the marginal costs of dam capacity are equated to the marginal bene…ts from agriculture. Such practice can be observed in e.g. the Ebro River basin in northern Spain.
There are two cases for which it is optimal not to build. This is the case if the condition of the above proposition does not hold, either 
Hydropower generation
Hydropower used in over 150 countries provided 19% of the world's total electricity supply around the millennium (World Commission on Dams and Development, 2000) and has increased to 24% today (NREL, 2014). If dam capacity are built for hydropower generation purposes only, we have the following relation:
and c w (f w y) = 0 for all x w ; x d ; i d ; f w y 0.
All these additional restrictions imply that, after substitution of y = D q w 0, we consider the reduced optimization problem for 2 (0; 1] and the cost function c (D) :
s.t.
We have the same three cases as in Section 3.
Case 1':
As we will make clear in the appendix, this special case follows directly from the general Case 1 of section 3. Let the pair q w and q d be the unique solution to
We have the following result. capacity make it optimal to install less capacity than q w + 1 ( q d f d ), i.e., the optimum levels under costless dam capacity building.
Although this special case also seems to follow directly from the general Case 2, there is an important caveat that we have to impose. Proceeding as in Case 1', let the pairq w andq d be the unique solution to
Please note that (20) only holds when q d = D. It yields inconsistency when
Then, bearing in mind that h 0 w (q w ) 0, we arrive at
All these inequalities can only hold if and only if = 1 and q w = q w such that h 
We have the following result. Loosely speaking, the above result implies an impossibility result for realistic values of evaporation losses of stored water, i.e., any < 1. Here we obtain an entirely di¤erent conclusion than Haddad (2011) , who assumes = 1 and constant marginal costs of dam capacity building.
. Proceeding as in Case 1', letq w andq d be the unique solution to
We have the following result. 
Concluding remarks
To analyze the impact of dam capacity choice under rivalry use and externalities, we extend the hydropower generation model in Haddad (2011) . Having included the competing use of water resources and non-linear building costs of dam capacity as well as the externalities of dams in a welfare optimization model, we obtained the optimal dam capacity for multifunctional dams such as providing infrastructure for industrial and households' water use, conjunctive use of hydropower generation and irrigation, reserving water in the wet season for use in the dry season and mitigating ‡ooding damages. The optimal solution shows that optimal dam capacity depends on marginal bene…ts of hydropower generation and the constraining factors. The optimal water management can be achieved by using speci…c seasonal prices in a decentralized manner. This research o¤ers useful insights and lays the foundation for a policy framework tailored to di¤erent development stages of water resource management in the presence of hydropower systems.
In this paper, we have not included issues such as salt water intrusion in the dry season, in order to keep our analysis tractable. It is, however, worthwhile to give some re ‡ections on some relevant issues which are not formally discussed in the paper. 
Therefore the costs decrease when more fresh water ‡ows into the estuary. We regard irrigation i d as irrigation at elevated inland plots that are immune to saltwater intrusion, and irrigation on plots at the lowest parts of the delta can be included as bene…ts in the costs function for saltwater intrusion. Moreover, work, we will present further details of feasible extensions and an empirical analysis.
Appendix: Derivations
In this appendix, we derive the main results discussed in Section 3. Optimization program (9) is strictly convex and, therefore, it allows a unique welfare optimum with nonnegative shadow prices. Moreover, water using activities such as consumptive use by industry and households, hydropower generation, irrigation and storage of water have the property of free disposal, i.e., agents are not forced to consume excess water. Consequently, the marginal bene…ts of these activities are nonnegative. Formally, in the optimum it holds that v 0 (x ) 0, h 0 (q ) 0
The Lagrangian function of system (9) is given by
The …rst-order-conditions for a positive solution, i.e. x w ; x d ; q w ; q d ; i d ; D > 0, are
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
and from combining the …rst and third line of (22) and the second and fourth line of (22), we obtain:
. Whatever the optimum, these conditions must always hold.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. By the fourth line of (22)
, and then, by the nonnegativity of shadow prices,
After substituting the third line of (22) into the sixth line of (22), we obtain
Whatever the optimum, these conditions must always hold. 
